

HOW TO PRICE & HEDGE VARIABLE ANNUITIES WITH UNHEDGEABLE RISK

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Topics



- 1. Risk: the hedgeable, the diversifiable and the unbearable
- 2. The decomposition of surrender risk
- 3. Pricing & valuation
- 4. Transformation of policies
- 5. Case study: target volatility fund derivatives

Typical GMAB / DB product (with knockout)







Hedgeable:

- Exchanges: equity, interest rates, FX futures
- Vanilla OTC: equity index options, variance swaps, interest rate swaps, swaptions
- predictable surrender

Not hedgeable, but measurable:

- Basis risk hedge versus fund benchmarks
- Mortality
- Diversity in surrender experience unrelated to capital market
- Very long-term interest rates and vega

Moral hazard / not well measurable:

- Benchmark versus actual fund performance
- Fund switching option
- New business volume
- Surrender induced by sales network
- Longevity and other long-term trend risk

Market-consistent value of hedgeable component of the liability Cost of capital for non-hedgeable component of the liability Limits, exclusions, conservative pricing paired with profit participation

Surrender Risk Experience Analysis



contract	number of policies	policies written
1		01.04.2008 - 03.09.2009
total	30306	



period	exposure years	# surrenders	# deaths	# knock-out
Apr 09 – Feb 10	20646	749	53	31

Surrender Experience Analysis Explaining Variables (1)



First understand the distribution of the explaining variables:



Surrender Experience Analysis Explaining Variables (2)

Munich RE

First understand the distribution of the explaining variables:



Exposure per Moneyness and Elapsed Months

moneyness and elapsed months are sufficiently spread
both can be used as explaining variables

Surrender Experience Analysis Generalized Linear Model



Use only moneyness, size and the age of the policy as explaining variables:

Surrender Probabilities versus Moneyness, Elapsed Months, Size GLM model prediction 0 raw observation new surrender assumption 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 small small matured new 0.8 0.6 0.4 annualized surrender probability 0.2 6666668 0.0 large large matured new 0.8 0.6 0 0 0 0.4 0.2 0 0 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 moneyness

 as expected: we observe a limited rationality in the surrender behavior

 surrender rates are significantly lower in the first three months after inception

• surrender rates are more rational for larger sizes

Combining actuarial and market consistent modeling The market-consistent production value



» Decomposition of the net liability into two components:

L = H + R

» Common core in Swiss Solvency Test, Solvency II, IFRS phase II, CRO-Forum, CFO-Forum*:

The market-consistent production value of the liability is computed as

v(L) = m(H) + c(R)

where m(H) is the cost of setting up and running the hedging strategy (including upfront and expected future transaction costs) and c(R) is the cost of the risk capital required to carry the residual risk:

c(R) = "hurdle rate" * "risk capital contribution of R"

Legend L = Liability H = Hedgeable component R = Residual risk v(..) = Value of ... c(..) = Costs of ...

m(...) = Market value of ...

"Hurdle rate" = the return on risk capital required in MR Group

"Risk capital contribution of R" = the amount by which MR's group risk increases due to the additional risk R

Hedging strategy determines the production value.

Pre-2003 state of non-convergence



Banks' complete market models cannot explain:

- bid-ask spreads
- when you should hedge and when not
- how to extrapolate (e.g. term structure of interest rates and term structure of implied vol)
- how to value non-traded insurance risks

Insurers' "real world models" can lead to suboptimal behavior:

- potential to be outsmarted by banks if not market consistent
- potential to buy "toxic waste" without getting a "fair price" for it (CRO Forum: "Financial Risk Mitigation")
- potential conflict with shareholder's desire for both transparency and short-term P&L stability



Main idea goes back to Kalberer (2006):

payoff(p,s,t) = weight(p,t) * f(g(p,t),s,t)

- p: policy parameters
- s: scenario
- t: date

g(p): transformed policy parameters (= parameters of a financial derivative)

Task: find appropriate f and g, such that g(p) has lower dimension than p!

Example GMDB:

 $GMDB = \sum_{t} Put(with exercise date t) * "Probability that policyholder dies at t"$

Separate the dependency on policy parameters as much as possible from the dependency on the market scenarios.

=> Approximate cash flows (not PVs!) rather model-free.



product	number of policies	number of model points in traditional approach,	number of basis products in transformation approach,
		5% bucket size in moneyness	5% bucket size in moneyness
1	26306	2736	20
2	36738	2635	8
3	168	142	45
4	1099	525	15
5	776	391	10
6	235	156	8
7	46	44	20
8	222	176	12
9	1835	1020	50



A target volatility fund consists of a risky component and a virtually risk-less "control component". The realized volatility σ_t of the risky component is measured with a predetermined formula and the weight of the risky component for the next business day is then chosen as $w_{t+1} = \sigma_{target} / \sigma_t$, based on today's volatility estimate σ_t . The two main types of volatility estimates are

- equal-weighted estimates of realized volatility and
- exponentially weighted estimates of realized volatility:

 $\sigma_t^2 = \lambda \sigma_{t-1}^2 + (1 - \lambda) 252 R_t^2$,

where R_t is the log return of the risky component $R_t = \log(S_t/S_{t-1})$.

Base case:

- daily returns R_t,
- exponential smoothing with λ = 0.975,
- daily rebalancing, no thresholds (ignores transaction costs for the moment)

Vega Profiles





Vega Profiles: exponentially weighted TVF

Stylized fact:

- exponential smoothing almost completely removes long-term vega
- short-term vega remains

Gamma Profiles





Stylized fact:

 non-linearity (gamma) in the PV profile versus the underlying remains almost uneffected by the TVF mechanism

• large gamma is caused by dynamic surrender, ratchets/clicks – which is not mitigated by TVF mechanism

•TVF derivatives need to be hedged by rolling over short-term (1-3 months) hedge instruments like puts or variance swaps on the TVF underlying(s).

The volatility term premium



SPX realized and implied volatility 2000 - 2007



Stylized fact: The TVF mechanism

• removes the *volatility term premium* (the spread long-term implied volatility minus short-term implied volatility) but

• does not remove the short-term implied-realized volatility spread.



a=c(0.2,0,0),b=c(0,0,0),lambda=c(0,0),kappa=1,v0=0.2,tv=0.1,cap=1,alpha=0.97





a=c(0.2,0,0),b=c(-0.8,0.02,0.02),lambda=c(50,50),kappa=2,v0=0.2,tv=0.1,cap=1,alpha=0.97





a=c(0,0,0.08),b=c(0,0,0),lambda=c(0,4),kappa=1,v0=0.2,tv=0.1,cap=1,alpha=0.97





a=c(0.08,0,0.1),b=c(-0.5,0,0.1),lambda=c(2,2),kappa=2,v0=0.05,tv=0.1,cap=1,alpha=0.97





- 1. Explicit guarantees are good for shareholders, policyholders and regulators: increased transparency.
- 2. Surrender can be dangerous. Monitoring surrender experience increases hedge efficiency.
- 3. Valuation of liabilities and hedging are closely related. The "production value" approach to valuation aligns the valuation with the actually chosen hedge instruments. Calibrate to "deep and liquid markets" only.
- 4. The risk management of capital market risks embedded in life (re) contracts is non-trivial. A bank-like operation ("hedging platform") is needed for quantification, hedge design and controlling of the risks. Economies of scale are needed to run the operation successfully. Transformation of large numbers of policies is part of the story.
- 5. Analysis of TVF derivatives requires explicit modeling of jumps.